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Abstract - An economy’s production set is the collection 
of all net output vectors that the economy is capable of 
producing with a given technology and fixed quantites 
of primary factors of production. The boundary of this 
set is called the production possibility frontier or PPF. 
We show that, if the efficiency-wage hypothesis holds, a 
country’s PPF, though conceptually valid, is an 
operationally irrelevant concept, because the economy 
never operates on the PPF, which is a view that ought to 
be appreciated in light of persistent unemployment in 
the new structure of economies of the post-21st-Century-
crisis world.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In mainstream economics, an economy’s 
production set is taken to be the collection of all net 
output vectors that the economy is capable of 
producing, by transforming inputs into outputs, with 
a given technology and with fixed quantities of 
primary factors of production.1 The boundary of this 
set is called the production possibility frontier (PPF). 
An essential feature of the production set of an 
economy is that it is invariant to changes in market 
prices.2 In such a case, there is a unidirectional 
relationship insofar as exogenous changes in 
technology or fixed factor supplies can induce 
changes in general equilibrium market prices, but 
changes in market prices do n t affect the structure of 
the production set, nor shift its boundary in any 
manner whatsoever. At a theoretical level, this paper 
forms part of a program, the purpose of which is to 
establish that operationally the economy’s market-
invariant PPF is an irrelevant concept insofar as there 
is a bidirectional relationship between an economy’s 
actual production possibilities on the one hand, and 
the general equilibrium market prices, on the other. 
We accomplish the goal of establishing this claim by 
utilizing the efficiency-wage hypothesis in the 
manner of Solow (1979). 
Egbert and Naqvi (2011) also achieve this 
objective. However, they do so by embedding a small 
open economy in an integrated world capital market, 
so that under endogenous international capital 
mobility, a government policy change can alter the 
quantity of capital that locates in the country, and 
thereby change the structure of its economy’s 
production set, and inter alia shift the boundary of 
such a set. In this paper, we show that if the 
efficiency-wage hypothesis holds, the operational 
production pattern in the economy has nothing to do 
with the concept of a PPF in economics as we know 
it. Moreover, in contrast with Egbert and Naqvi, we
demonstrate that this is so both (a) without 
international capital mobility in a small open 
economy, and (b) in a closed economy. 
 
Related work by Albert and Meckl (2001) 
provides a canonical formulation of the Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model with the efficiency-wage 
phenomenon exhibited in both sectors of the 
economy. This is based on the formulation of 
Summers (1988). By making the effort function in 
each sector depend on fixed, though intersectorally 
differential, mark-ups on the economy-wide, 
weighted-average wage rate (their reference wage), 
their model simultaneously exhibits, both involuntary 
unemployment and stable inter-industry wage 
differentials. In addition, they demonstrate that (1) all 
properties, including the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
the Ryczynski theorem, and so on, hold, if factor 
intensities are interpreted in the cost-share sense, and 
(2) that the result of immigration can be a lowering of 
the unemployment rate, whereas Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) can raise unemployment. These 
latter results are both quite startling – though entir ly 
correct and intuitive – once the dependence of 
unemployment changes on sectoral distribution of 
employment is noted. 
 
Our purpose here is different from that of Albert 
and Meckl (2001). It is to demonstrate the 
endogenous character of the operational PPF in the 
face of persistent unemployment, in a Specific 
Factors model.3 To this end, we adopt the efficiency 
wage function used by Solow (1979).4 
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Shiller (2010) and Stiglitz (2011), among others, 
call for endogenizing some variables that were in the 
pre-21st-Century-crisis world taken to be exogenously 
specified in economic models. Blinder (2010) goes 
further and asks for a complete overhaul of the 
macroeconomics curriculum, and talks about 
planning to drop the assumption of a single-interest-
rate economy from macroeconomic models in the 
next, 12th Edition, of his joint text with Baumol.5 
These observations are driven by the failure of 
macroeconomics to adequately predict or fully 
comprehend the economic crisis impacting the global 
economy starting in 2007 to 2008. Our primary 
purpose in writing the current paper is to heed this
call for change in the spirit of Blinder, Shiller and 
Stiglitz. 
 
Section 2 lays out the Specific Factors model 
with the efficiency-wage hypothesis, and shows how 
the pattern of production and the unemployment rate 
are market dependent for a small open economy 
without international capital mobility. Section 3 
considers the effects of government-policy induced 
market price changes on the production pattern in the 
economy. Section 4 extends our result to the case of a 
closed economy, so as to rule out any presumption 
that such market-dependence of production pattern 
arises from the openness of the economy. Section 5 
contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. Specific Factors Model with the 
Efficiency-wage Hypothesis 
 
Consider the standard Specific Factors model 
with the efficiency-wage hypothesis built into it.6 Let 
all economic activity in an economy be divided into 
two parts: Manufactured goods, M, and Services, S, 
produced by the technology embodied in the 








 = , ),   (2) 
 
where Ld is the number of unskilled workers 
demanded in the manufacturing sector, and  the 
endogenously determined quantity of capital 
employed in the manufacturing sector of the 
economy, whereas  and are, respectively, the 
number of skilled workers and the amount of capital 
employed in service-sector production. In this 
economy, capital is intersectorally mobile, but 
unskilled labor is specific to manufacturing whereas 
skilled labor is specific to services. Moreover, in Eq. 
(1), ) is the number of efficiency units of labor 
delivered by each worker, with the property that it 
rises as the unskilled wage rate rises, but at a 
diminishing rate, so that  ′) > 0 and ′′) < 0, 
and  is the unskilled wage rate.
7 If unskilled labor 
employed in manufacturing is seen in terms of 
efficiency units, instead of in terms of the number of 





Each firm in the manufacturing sector is 
perfectly competitive in the commodity market and 
the capital market, where it behaves as a price takr. 
It chooses how much capital to rent and how many 
unskilled workers to hire. However, it also chooses 
what wage rate to offer the unskilled workers so as to 
maximize profit. In the labor market, therefore, the 
manufacturing firms have a limited ability to 
determine the wage offer. The unskilled wage rate is 
thus a decision variable for each firm because a 
higher wage rate induces each hired worker to deliver 
greater efficiency. All firms are identical, as are all 
workers, and capital is homogenous as well. 
Here )	

 , ) and , ) are concave 
production functions that are characterized by (i) the 
Inada conditions, including indispensable inputs, (ii) 
constant returns to scale, and (iii) the law of 
diminishing returns, which together imply that (iv) 
inputs are co-operative.8  
 
First consider the case in which this is a small 
open economy. Further, let services be the numéraire 
commodity, so that the price of the service sector 
output equals one. Then,  is the relative price of 
the manufactures in terms of services. Additional 








 +	 = .    (4) 
 
Equation (3) asserts that, given that capital is 
mobile across sectors, the values of marginal product 
of capital are equal in both sectors, and their comm n 
value equals the endogenously determined domestic 
rental rate of capital, r, measured in terms of services, 
and Eq. (4) asserts that the demand and hence 
employment of capital in the two sectors equals its 
fixed supply , on the assumption that r is perfectly 
flexible. 
 
Additionally, the unskilled wage rate in the 








 ′ !) !
 !)
= 1,       (6) 
 
where Eq. (6) is the well-known Solow elasticity 
condition.9 The unskilled wage rate, while in 
principle perfectly flexible, is sticky at  , which is 
Int. J Latest Trends Fin. Eco. Sc.                                         Vol-2 No. 3 September, 2012 
 
246 
determined solely by Eq. (6), due to the incentive of 
the manufacturing firms to offer the wage that 
minimizes cost with respect to a unit of effective, 
effort-adjusted unskilled labor, rather than with 
respect to raw, unskilled labor that is not adjusted for 
efficiency.10 
 
Finally, we have 
 
#, ) = 	#,   (7) 
 
which determines the skilled wage rate. Notice thatin 
the model, the two wage rates are also expressed in 
terms of the same numéraire commodity, viz., 
services. 
 
Without loss of generality, assume that 
manufactures are imported (implying that some 
services are outsourced to this country by some 
foreign countries). Then  is the domestic relative 
price of the manufactures in terms of services, and
 = 
∗ + %, where 
∗  is the world price of 
manufactures that this country takes as exogenously 
given, since 
∗  is determined on the world market 
for manufactured goods. Here, % ≥ 0 is the import 
tariff that is exogenously imposed by the country’s 
government. This tariff has a value that is less than 
%', which is the prohibitive tariff that snuffs out all
imports. 
 
As already noted, from Eq. (6) alone, the value 
of  =   is uniquely determined. With this, for 
% = 0, which means that in free trade equilibrium, 
from Eq. (3), Eq. (4) and Eq. (5),  =	(, 
 =	( and 	

 =		)
 are uniquely determined, as is 
 = 	 ̂, all of which are functions of the exogenous 
variables , , and . Finally, substituting for ( in 
Eq. (7) uniquely determines  # as a function of the 
three exogenous variables. Notice also that 
unemployment of unskilled workers in the economy 
is equal to +, = 	- −		)
 > 0, which is a function also 
of the fourth exogenous variable 	-, and this 
unemployment arises as an equilibrium phenomenon, 
because the manufacturing firms do not reduce the 
unskilled wage rate for fear of facing reduced 
efficiency of incumbent workers. 
 
Once the equilibrium values of these endogenous 
variables are plugged into the production functions 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we also obtain the pattern of 
production in the economy, (  and /, which lies 
strictly inside the PPF because of the unemployment 
of unskilled labor, despite full employment of both 
capital and skilled labor in the economy. It can be 
verified that the restrictions placed on the production 
functions and on the efficiency function ensure that 
the general equilibrium supply curves for both final 
commodities are upward sloping. This is true in spite 
of the fact that the economy operates strictly inside 
the PPF. 
 
3. Policy Intervention 
 
To see the effects of policy intervention, in 
particular the effect of an import tariff, a diagram is 
helpful. 
 
In Figure 1, the fact that   is determined from 
Eq. (6), which also determines  ), from the 
efficiency wage function, is utilized. Substituting for 
these two values in Eq. (3), Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we 
obtain (, ( and 	)

under free trade, for % = 0, as 
displayed in Figure 1. Suppose next that the 
government imposes a positive tariff on the imports 
of manufactures. That means % > 0. Then, the left-
hand side (LHS) of Eq. (3) becomes higher, 
displayed by a rightward shift of the curve 
representing the value of marginal product of capital 
in manufacturing, as the (red) dashed curve. To 
restore equilibrium, given the law of diminishing 
returns, the employment of capital must rise in 
manufacturing. In Figure 1, this is given by 0 >
(. With a given quantity  of capital in the 
economy, this means that less capital is now 
employed in the service sector as a consequence, 
given by 0 < ( in Figure 1. 
 
Notice also that with more capital employed in 
manufacturing, given that inputs are cooperative, th  
value of marginal product of unskilled labor rises, so 
that the LHS of Eq. (5) becomes higher. Since the 
RHS of Eq. (5) remains fixed due to Eq. (6), given 
the law of diminishing returns, the employment of 
unskilled labor must rise in manufacturing for 
equilibrium to be maintained, so that 	1
 > 	)
, 
thereby reducing unskilled unemployment in the 
economy, which is now +2 = 	- 	−		1
 < +,. 
 
Due to the positive import tariff on 
manufactures, a change in income distribution in 
favor of unskilled workers occurs, simply because the 
unskilled wage rate remains unchanged but 
unemployment is lower. Further, since the supply of 
skilled labor, , is exogenously given, the decline in 
capital employed in the services sector lowers the 
productivity of skilled workers, and inter alia reduces 
the skilled wage rate, #. This means that 3# <  # 
and total earnings of skilled workers decline. Also, 
with a fixed quantity of capital in the country, a 
higher rental rate of capital implies that the aggre ate 
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earnings of capital owners rise. Notice that the 
rightward shift of the curve representing the value of 
marginal product of unskilled labor, the (red) dashed 
curve, occurs due to two forces: an increase in the 
domestic relative price of manufactures and an 
increase in the employment of unskilled labor in 
manufacturing. 
 
Once again, under tariff protection, the new 
equilibrium values of these endogenous variables can 
be substituted in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) to obtain the new 
pattern of production in the economy, 0 > (  and 
4 < /, which also lies strictly inside the PPF because 
of the unemployment of unskilled labor despite full 
employment of both capital and skilled labor in the
economy. The manufacturing sector expands, 
because more unskilled labor and more capital are 
employed under tariff protection, but the service 
sector contracts since some capital gets extracted 
from this sector. 
 
4. Closed Economy 
 
The economy considered so far is a small open 
economy for which the domestic relative price of 
manufactures  is exogenously fixed, either because 
of equality with the parametric world price in free 
trade, or due to that reason and a government 
specified fixed import tariff. However, if the 
economy is closed,  has to be endogenously 
determined, which happens due to the fact that 
domestic demand for manufactures must be met 
solely by domestic output supply, and by Walras law, 
the service market will also clear. So, for a closed 
economy, we have, 
5,  +  − 6) +	7
 = , , ----)         (8) 
Where, in Eq. (8), 5 is domestic demand for 
manufactured goods, 6 is the exogenous lump-sum 
tax revenue collected by the government, rendering 
 +  − 6 as the disposable personal income of 
the country, and 7 is the exogenous government 
demand for manufactures. With this specification, 
Eq. (1) – Eq. (8) constitutes the model of a closed 
economy, and Eq. (8) serves to endogenously 
determine the Walrasian general equilibrium 
domestic relative price of manufactures, at a value of 
 =	21.
11 In a closed economy, the relative price is 
an endogenous variable, but it is replaced here by two 
exogenous variables, 7 and 6. 
 
Straightforward reasoning will show that an 
increase in government demand for manufactures 
will result in a rightward shift of the curve 
representing the value of marginal product of capital 
in manufacturing, not unlike that represented in 
Figure 1 as the (red) dashed curve. This is analogous 
to an increase in the import tariff on manufactures, 
because it will also raise the domestic relative price 
of manufactures, although this will be an induced 
change rather than one that is exogenous in the tariff 
case. 
 
To see this, consider an increase in 7. As is 
evident from Eq. (8), this increases the domestic 
aggregate demand for manufactures, which, by itself, 
leads to an increase in  to, say, ̂/. As a 
consequence, given upward sloping general 
equilibrium supply curves, the output of 
manufactures rises to (( , and this is accomplished, 
one, by increased employment of capital in 
manufacturing to ((. Moreover, due to the 
cooperative nature of inputs, greater employment of 
capital induces increased productivity of unskilled 
workers, so that the LHS of Eq. (5) rises. Since th 
RHS of Eq. (5) remains unchanged due to Eq. (6), to 
restore the equality in Eq. (5), given the law of 
diminishing returns, manufacturing firms must hire 
more unskilled workers, say 	))
, which constitutes the 
second cause of an expansion of the manufacturing 
sector output. Naturally, unemployment falls to +,) . 
Clearly, consequent upon an increase in 7, there is a 
rightward shift of the curve representing the value of 
marginal product of capital in manufacturing in 
Figure 1, due to both an increase in 	 and an 
increase in Ld. 
 
Since capital supply is fixed, more capital 
employed in manufacturing implies less of it will be 
employed in the service sector, causing the service 
sector output to contract to //, and the skilled wage 
rate also to fall to ( because of the reduced 
productivity of skilled workers, since they have less 
capital to work with, as seen from Eq. (7). 
 
As with an import tariff on manufactures, there is 
a similar change in factoral income distribution, with 
skilled workers earning less,  (, while unskilled 
workers as a group becoming better off due to lower 
unemployment at the same wage rate,  	)
)
. Also, 
from (3) it is evident that with lower employment of 
capital in the service sector, the RHS becomes higher 
due to the law of diminishing returns, so the rental 
rate of capital rises to ̂/, leading to an increase in the 
income of capital owners to ̂/. 
 
It can be verified that the consequences are 
exactly the opposite if the government increases its 
demand for services, instead of increasing its demand 
for manufactures. Are the consequences of a 
reduction of government taxation on all the 
endogenous variables exactly the same as the effects 
of an increase in government demand for 
manufactures? The answer is “no.“ This is due to the 
fact that a reduction in lump-sum taxes leads to an 
increase in disposable personal income, and given 
positive marginal propensities to consume both 
manufactures and services (adding up to 1), the 
consumer demand for services also rises. This leads 
to an increase in the aggregate demand for services 
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also, which, by creating an excess demand for 
services at the pre-tax-reduction relative price of 
manufactures, generates a force to reduce this relative 
price. The final outcome, therefore, depends on the 
relative magnitude of the marginal propensity to 
consume manufactures versus that to consume 
services. 
 
This much is clear: the increase in the relative 
price of manufactures, in magnitude, will necessarily 
be less under a tax reduction scheme than under an 
increase in government demand for manufactures. It 
could well be the case that the relative price of 
manufactures falls, if the marginal propensity to 
consume services is sufficiently greater than that o 
consume manufactures. The output supply response 
of manufactures and services will correspondingly be 
dependent on the direction and magnitude of the 
change in the relative price of manufactures. Thus t e 
consequences for the economy are much more 
complicated due to a tax reduction than due to an 
increase in government demand for manufactures. 
 
To obtain more precise inferences from the 
effects of a tax-reduction policy, more restrictions 
would have to be placed on consumers’ preferences, 
for example, that personal preferences are both 
identical and homothetic. Such restrictions would be 
helpful for positive-theoretic purposes of description 
and prediction, though not for the normative purpose 
of policy prescription.12 If all consumers do have 
preferences that are identical and homothetic, the 
behavior of all consumers can be portrayed by a 
single consumption function for descriptive and 
predictive purposes. Still, more information is need d 
regarding both marginal propensities to consume the 
two commodities and regarding the price elasticities 
of demand for the two commodities, to reach more 
refined conclusions. This, incidentally, also exposes 
the weakness of macroeconomic thinking relative to 
general equilibrium analysis, since in macroeconomic 
analysis such issues are assumed away. 
 
It is noteworthy that all of the phenomena 
described thus far, whether for a small open economy 
or for a closed economy, arise well inside the PPF as 
we know it. Hence the redundancy of the concept of 
the PPF, as immune from the influences of market 




5. Concluding Remarks 
 
If stylized facts dictate, the efficiency-wage 
hypothesis can be built into the service sector and
would apply to skilled workers. The exercise would 
progress along similar lines, except that in this ca e 
the skilled wage rate would become sticky, leading to 
the unemployment of skilled workers, instead of the 
unemployment of unskilled workers, as in the model 
of the current paper. The analysis, however, would 
trivially be along the same lines, with the only 
qualification that “unskilled labor” would be replaced 
by “skilled labor” in terms of the conclusions that we 
have reached. The actual economy under examination 
would determine which version of the model is more 
applicable. Of course, there is nothing wrong in 
assuming that the efficiency-wage phenomenon 
arises in both sectors, and with regard to both 
unskilled workers and skilled workers: for unskilled 
due to the fact that a higher wage rate provides more 
nutrition and hence more efficiency, and for the 
skilled workers because a higher wage rate serves as 
a disincentive to shirk by raising the opportunity cost 
of getting fired from the job. Both wage rates would, 
in such a case, become sticky. 
 
Another extension would be to include an 
internationally non-traded commodity, in the manner 
of Batra and Naqvi (1989). This has the advantage of 
permitting an analysis of real exchange rate 
variations, since this rate is the ratio of the price of 
the non-traded commodity to the index of prices of 
the internationally traded commodities. 
 
Returning to the fundamental reason for our 
writing this paper, we wish to emphasize, as Egbert 
and Naqvi (2011) have done in the context of 
international capital mobility, that a re-evaluation f 
the concepts and analyses we as economists are pron 
to undertaking is warranted. In this instance, we 
suggest a reconsideration with respect to the concept 
of the PPF, on the so-called supply side of the 
economy. We are, in fact, attempting to answer the 
Blinder-Shiller-Stiglitz call for thinking anew the 
conceptual basis of economic analysis in the 21st
Century, post-economic-crisis world. 
 
The fundamental point we wish to emphasize is 
that extremely valuable conceptual structures have 
been built by economists in the past 200 years or so, 
and we are in the enviable position to utilize them, so 
that only relatively minor, though considerably 
judicious, decisions need to be made to direct our 
attention to the economic reality that now faces us, as 
opposed to the one that faced us in the past. We argue 
that it is not a case of agency failures. Rather, it is a 
case of a change in the structure of economies, 
especially with respect to persistent unemployment, 
so that a slight change in the approach to observation 
will actually give us a way to comprehend the 
structure of this new economic reality that has 
emerged in the post-economic-crisis world. 
 
Let us heed the call for a change in perspective, 
while retaining and preserving the enormous 
intellectual legacy we have been left by our 
economist forefathers and foremothers. Amendments 
to theory that Blinder, Shiller and Stiglitz have called 
for, i.e., to endogenize some variables and 
relationships that have hitherto been treated as 
exogenous in the post-21st-Century-crisis economies, 
Int. J Latest Trends Fin. Eco. Sc.                                         Vol-2 No. 3 September, 2012 
 
249 
are quite sufficient for explaining phenomena of the
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Appendix  
This appendix contains notes that are material to the 
issue, but could detract from the coherence of the 
narrative in the body of the paper. 
1. Typically, among other restrictions imposed on 
this set, it is assumed that the set is (a) non-empty, (b) 
compact (closed and bounded) and (c) convex.  
 
2. For a classic treatment, see Koopmans (1957) and 
Debreu (1959). 
 
3. Unlike our objective, the Albert-Meckl (2001, p. 
287) stated goal is to demonstrate that “all HO results 
have close … analogues” in the HO model with the 
efficiency wage function in each sector dependent on 
a fixed sector-specific mark-up on their reference 
wage. The more general formulation in Albert and 
Meckl (1997) has the additional advantage that it 
unifies and synthesizes a large body of diverse 
efficiency wage models, primarily because they show 
that their model entails a very useful property, which 
also obtains in their 2001 work, that the general 
equilibrium outcome maximizes the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the country, although under an 
additional linear resource constraint, so that the 
envelope theorem properties of the constrained-GDP 
function are preserved. 
 
4. In our formulation, as in Solow (1979), the 
efficiency of unskilled workers (only in one sector), 
depends on the real wage rate. While it is measured 
in terms of services in our formulation, nothing 
would be lost if the real wage rate were measured in 
units of manufactures. 
 
5. See Baumol and Blinder (2009). 
 
6. See Jones (1971) for the original formulation. 
 
7. These properties have to hold locally for the 
existence of equilibrium, though not for uniqueness. 
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Uniqueness requires additional properties including 
that the these conditions hold ∀ ∈ :,∞), with 
 ′0;) = 	∞ and  ′∞<) = 	0. 
 
8. The cross-partial derivatives of the two production 
functions are both positive. Intuitively this means that 
more capital increases the marginal productivity of 
unskilled labor in manufacturing, and conversely. 
Also, more capital employed in the service sector 
raises the marginal productivity of skilled labor, and 
conversely. 
 
9. By substituting the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. 
(5) for the value of marginal product of labor, this 
follows from the first order condition of profit 
maximization with respect to the unskilled wage rate. 
 
10. Solow (1979) writes, “The upshot is: if the wage 
enters the short-run production function, a cost 
minimizing firm will leave its wage offer unchanged 
no matter how its output varies if and only if the 
wage enters the production function in a labor 
augmenting way.” (p. 81). This stickiness of the wage 
rate arising from the behavior of firms, rather than its 
rigidity, is precisely the cause of unemployment 
emerging as an equilibrium phenomenon despite the 
willingness of unemployed workers to offer to work 
for less. Moreover, this entailed constancy, instead of 
imposed constancy of the wage rate, can permit the 
use of the fixed-factor-price constrained GDP 
function that Neary (1985) proposes for a fruitful 
unification and synthesis of the literature on 
international capital mobility and minimum wage 
rates in general equilibrium. 
 
11. Other endogenous variable values, =̃4, generically 
speaking, are to be similarly denoted in general 
equilibrium for the closed economy. 
 
12. For the soundness (acceptability) of normative 
policy prescription, it would also have to be the case 
that all persons in the country actually have exactly 
the same income, to which equal weights are attached 
in social evaluation; unless, of course, the value 
judgment is also advanced that equal weights s ould 
be attached to unequal personal incomes in social 
evaluation. Indeed, Sen (1979) writes, “given 
homothetic preferences identical for all, … the  
market behavior of a group of consumers can be  
treated  as if  it  were  that  of  one  consumer … 
While this renders distribution of income irrelevant 
for explaining or predicting market behavior, it does 
not, of course, make distribution irrelevant for social 
welfare! … While for the purpose of studying market 
behavior that assumption [of relevance of 
distribution] can be dropped still retaining the 
aggregation over the consumers, the same clearly 
does not hold for making social welfare judgments.” 
(pp. 27-28) 
 
Thus, if it is the case that homothetic preferences 
are identical for all persons in society, then this, by 
itself, fails to constitute a justification as to why 
equal weights ought to be assigned to persons with 
different incomes, which is the implicit value 
judgment inherent in the use of a “representative 
consumer’s” personal utility function as a social 
welfare evaluation function, simply because “ought” 
cannot be deduced from “is.” On the other hand, in 
addition to homothetic preferences identical for all 
persons, if it is also assumed that all persons in 
society have exactly the same income, in which case 
equal weighting may be justifiable as a value 
judgment for social evaluation, then the country 
becomes indistinguishable from a person, as, for 
instance, Robinson Crusoe without Man Friday 
constituting a one-person society. We make no such 
claim. 
